The standard map of Gulf oil risk focuses on the Strait of Hormuz. For Saudi Arabia, that is only the first layer. Moving crude west through the East-West Pipeline reaches Yanbu, but a cargo then has to choose between Bab el-Mandeb to the south, Suez or SUMED to the north, or a longer diversion around Africa. Oil security is therefore a network problem rather than a single-strait problem.
What the evidence establishes
EIA estimates that 20.9 million barrels per day of petroleum liquids moved through Hormuz in the first half of 2025. Its September 2026 outlook shows how conflict radically changed those flows: Hormuz volumes fell to an estimated 4.9 million b/d in the second quarter of 2026 while Bab el-Mandeb rose to 8.1 million b/d. Suez and SUMED together handled about 5.8 million b/d in the same quarter.
The commercial reading
Those shifts demonstrate both resilience and substitution limits. Pipelines and alternative sea lanes can redirect large volumes, but concentrated rerouting increases the strategic importance of the alternative route. If Hormuz is constrained, Yanbu matters more. If Bab el-Mandeb is then threatened, Europe-bound Saudi barrels can still use Suez-linked infrastructure, while Asia-bound cargoes face a longer Cape voyage. Freight cost, voyage time and tanker availability become part of the energy-security calculation.
What to watch next
Track quarterly flows through all four routes together: Hormuz, Bab el-Mandeb, Suez/SUMED and the Cape of Good Hope. A fall in one chokepoint is not automatically a fall in global supply if another route absorbs the barrels.
How to use this analysis
Infrastructure develops through planning, consent, procurement, construction, commissioning and use. Proposed capacity should not be added to operating capacity, and throughput should not be confused with design limits. For a business user, local connection, reliability, price and service date are often more important than national totals. Saudi evidence should distinguish citizen and total-population measures, public-programme targets and recorded outcomes, and oil from non-oil activity.
Source and verification note
The reporting base for this article is U.S. EIA: Red Sea chokepoints and U.S. EIA: September 2026 Short-Term Energy Outlook and U.S. EIA: World Oil Transit Chokepoints. The link is provided to the source page or release so readers can check the reporting period, definitions and later revisions. Figures are not extended beyond the source's geographic or institutional scope, and forecasts remain labelled as expectations until an official release records the outcome.